How to read Brexit

A short essay.

There are many political studies that have picked through the meaning of Britain's Brexit. And the Brexit vote was also accompanied by a storm of data, as social scientists tried to pick out a hundred-and-one different characteristics of the voting Britons in the 2016 Referendum.

The leading analysts of public affairs, Ipsos, produced the largest summaries of Brexit voting (see Ipsos ) and their view of the basic patterns of Brexit voting were the most accepted across the British media. The North of England, the Midlands, the West of England and Wales, and the older working class, were the sections of British society that mostly voted to leave the EU. But a sea of other analysts and social scientists also studied the vote, some less in terms of traditional British social blocs (A, B C1, C2 D - Upper Class – Elite, Upper Middle Class, Lower Middle Class, Working Class, Poor) but rather the response to Brexit of particular sections of what might be understood as the working class population as a whole (see, for example, blogs from the London School of Economics). Which does at least suggest that some of Britain's pollsters tell quite significantly different stories.

The various political accounts of Brexit across the British mainstream society and even at the edges of British society, were initially more homogeneous. Early on there was a general acceptance that there had been a (delayed) reaction in the West to globalisation and that the impact that it had made on larger, poorer and ignored communities had produced a 'democratic' revolt of those who were 'left-behind.' It was far from just the left in Britain that defined the Brexit movement as a working class upheaval, starting from working class hostility to prolonged austerity and the hostile political systems that maintained it.

In reality the content of being 'left behind' has always been a complex and unresolved matter.  Often, depending on a range of political arguments and certainly on unique national, regional and demographic contexts, support for Brexit meant that being 'left behind' was (and remains) a multiple and uneven experience. But in Britain in 2016 most right-wing inclined commentators began to identify three fundamentals among the voters who voted to leave. The first was the perceived danger of immigration (associated with the large refugee crisis in the mainland EU). The second was the pressures on the welfare state and particularly on the NHS. These two concerns were often combined. The third was the belief that EU immigrants lowered wages and conditions in the jobs-market. The most effective slogan of the Brexit argument turned out to be 'Take Back Control' from the pro-Brexit campaign. This was duly interpreted by the right as the working class wanting the British government to reduce immigration, increase funding to certain services and allow British workers' wages to rise, all of which were prevented by EU membership. This became the simple and accepted political explanation for the British rightwing when it came to the governmental requirements of Brexit.

Today, the British rights's desperate political conundrum lies not in their broadly agreed version of the meaning of the Brexit vote as such, but rather in the division of its main political party and, most critically the Tory's historic break from its historic mission to represent the heights of British capitalism. Trying to sort out the schism between the most powerful sections of the ruling class and its betrayal over EU membership by the Tory Party is now the critical question for Brexit going forward as far as the political right are concerned.

A big part of the left on the other hand took Brexit as working-class hostility resulting from the experience of austerity - as the real root of their class objection to the EU, which is, after all, the main machine organising globalisation in the European continent. Big Capital based in Britain were desperate to maintain EU membership and that showed who really had the most interest in remaining in the EU. Racism, it was claimed by some of the left, was mainly promoted by UKIP and the Tory right who had access to the media momentum in the Brexit campaign among large sections of the working class and which thereby distorted the real fundamentals of the real working class view. The Labour Party's leadership over the Brexit vote was a half-hearted shambles thus creating the space for UKIP etc. It was argued by (some of) the left for example that 'Taking Back Control' had diametrically different implications from its right wing version and instead the slogan showed universal hostility to Britain's political class and the need to replace it. The working class who voted for Brexit in 2016 were therefore right. They were sticking to important principles. Ultimately the EU was a large-scale capitalist operation and it was in the working class interest to remove their country from it.

While UKIP and the Tory right defined a crude and ill-thought-out meaning for the Brexit vote (which they still stick to) the left, from Blairite Labour MPs  through to radical left groups - have yet to establish a generally accepted understanding.

Before answering the question: How should we (really) read Brexit? It is worth noting that Britain's Brexit has allowed, indeed provoked, the central political and social questions of British (indeed Western) society from behind their 'normal' fog and now key terms like 'working class interests' and 'capitalism' are widely acknowledged as key starting points in respect of any real understanding of how society works. This clarification is not the result of any academic heave. It comes directly from Britain's deep political crisis. The crisis has capped the oil of British political hypocrisy that ruled generations of Britain's political leadership. Not surprisingly therefore the British Parliament is shocked to find itself dealing with real, big matters of wealth and power (not normally available to Parliament) and they can barely believe themselves or anybody else. The parliamentarians rant and cry at each other as they find themselves incapable of resolving a genuinely decisive political question.    

We know that for Britain's rightwing, Brexit's past is already established, but its future means the narrow but deepening chasm concentrated in the heart of the Tory Party. And that certainly will be a key part of the overall meaning of Brexit. And the implications will continue to blossom over the next 2 years at least. But teasing out the meaning of Brexit-past is more difficult for Britain's left. Leaving aside the (shockingly understated) working class split in Britain over the EU membership vote, where does a reading of Brexit start from?

It starts from removing a widespread but entirely mechanical version of politics and society which is reflected in the idea among some of the left that there are immovable principles - like stop lights. While processes in society form patterns, like a kaleidoscope those patterns are never exactly repeated. Everything is unique. In the context of eternal change and movement, which is what makes everything unique, there are both major and minor shifts. Some shifts in the pattern of society are so decisive that they transform everything, including society itself. War, revolution, plague, disasters, rip societies to pieces - and sometimes reconstitute them.

Wars are always bad, destructive and deadly. But some wars are inevitable, even necessary. It was necessary to reconstitute Nazi Germany. But that required horrible destruction, including the violent military defeat of the Nazis. In other words there are few if any inevitable or universal responses to the developments of the world. And that applies dramatically in the capitalist world, which is partly defined by its constant, social-economic movement. Some social, political and economic movement moves slowly in a reasonably predictable fashion. People often assume that they will live their lives in that way. But mostly, since their origin, capitalist societies have moved convulsively and combatively towards their own and towards other peoples.

The institutions created by capitalism, most essentially the modern state, have been constructed and constantly reconstructed as capitalism itself has recomposed, extended, expanded, and carried on its permanent struggle with its exploited classes. But despite the constant ebb and flow of the friction between the exploiters and the exploited, it is an ebb and flow. Welfare states have been thrown up in the West as a result of the organisation and militancy of the working class. The EU - a super state designed as a European platform for globalisation - emerged at the end of the push for Welfare States in Europe. Although the Western European states had to accept some reforms, the cores of their states were never reformed. And although the EU responds to some workers' rights, not only its core but most of its state hinterland remains, determinedly, unavailable. Reform of the EU (which is not the same as EU leaders making midnight compromises) is deliberately designed to be inaccessible. The EU was created to overcome the post war concessions made to the working class at national levels and to thereby strengthen big capitalism in Europe vis a vis other global centres.

In reality, above theoretical concepts, how do these forces (uniquely) combine in Britain's Brexit?

Ok. Surely the EU is a red light? Bring it down! And if you cannot bring it down at least get your nation out of its clutches. But wait. What if a layer of the ruling class of Britain, albeit a reactionary, small business, pro-tax haven layer of would-be imperialists, starts the fight against the EU? And what if a new, serious political force arises, running nearly 4 million votes in a General Election, based wholly on racism, and which is leading this fight against the EU? Is it really a 'principle' to vote to leave the EU in that context? Is not the key priority of the British working class and its organisations to smash this new historic horror of 'little Englanders' at all costs? It is surely not, after all this, a question of the researching the extent and depth of racism or otherwise inside the working class itself. A pointless exercise. It is the fact, the revolutionary fact, of this deadly racist surge heading for leadership in society that determines what action to take. Which is the dominant danger for the British working class and for other, European and wider working classes? The rise of the new right-wing with a huge social base and deep connections with the Tories that are close to power in Britain, or voting to stay in the EU, for now, without any illusions, to break the organised racist momentum.

That was the context, the meaning and the key question of Brexit for the left in 2016.

And in 2018?

From 2016 to 2018/19 an historic political shift has meant the over-determination of the new meaning of Brexit. For the left in Britain, Brexit is now, essentially, a part of the struggle to win a radical Labour government. The racist right are still active and constantly spawning new tendrils and initiatives. But they are limited. Official racism is more loud and vicious than ever. The British Prime Minister has only one lever that she relentlessly pulls to win a future government, and that is racism. But there is another huge political force in action, first with the radicalisation of youth, second with the tremendous momentum behind Labour's 2017 Manifesto and thirdly a growing sense of the need for deep, pro-working class change.

None of these developments are irrevocable but the unity of the the working class, ex retainers and ex leavers, is essential to the cause. And in this new context it is relevant to remove as much of the EU's obstacles as possible which are deliberately set to deny any radical, pro-working class government.

Splitting the Labour Party?

Labour's leader, Corbyn, has made a bold move regarding Britain's Brexit. He has used his 'meeting' with Prime Minister May to spell out a Labour proposal for Brexit, which includes Britain staying in a Customs Union and a single market with the EU. The benefits for the Labour leadership as a result of Corbyn's move are clear; first, he has set up a definitive alternative to May's deal. (May hopes she can fix her own rejected deal by getting some soothing words from the EU about the backstop and utilising the gathering fear of Tory MPs facing a possible 'no deal' Brexit.) Now there is a serious alternative to May's deal, even if she gets her modified backstop from Brussels. This could theoretically regroup some of the Tory pro-EU MPs who are currently hanging on to the proposed May deal 'for fear of something worse.' Corbyn's plan should, logically, bring together a real majority in Parliament - against both versions of the May deal. Except the Tories are unlikely to support Corbyn over anything.

Corbyn's proposal also carries through the unanimous Labour Party Conference vote on Brexit; to fight for a General Election first; to follow up with an alternative deal and then, should these options fall, to reopen the possibility of another referendum. (The effect on some rightwing Labour MPs has been to stir up yet another 'new party' project, and this time it is because Corbyn is carrying out Labour Party Conference policy. More on this later.)

Equally, should the Corbyn deal win in Parliament, it will also be supported, at least initially, by the EU, despite their fear and hatred of a potential Labour Government in Britain.

Should the Corbyn deal be accepted by Parliament, it would be taken as a genuine compromise between most leavers and remainers in the country. Even the proposal alone will give Corbyn's deal considerable weight among voters. It would also open the door again to free movement of European workers, and it could become a solid platform for the coming General Election, showing that there were bigger issues than Brexit. Labour would be seen as at least trying to 'pull people together' over Brexit. And finally, a Labour government following Brexit would not need necessarily to face EU dictats on nationalisations, government-investment banks etc.

Corbyn's proposal is therefore an acute danger for Prime Minister May (despite the likelihood that few Tories will ever actually vote for Corbyn - whatever their view of Brexit.) Initially she will deride Labour's Brexit plans as 'non-Brexit.' But her real fear is not that. May seeks her own deal to succeed because she wants to keep the Tory Party in Parliament together. She wants it to be 'her' deal which then keeps her leadership intact. May's one, over-riding, political contribution to Britain's people and the only real principle that she has ever fought for is that of slashing immigration and she believes can win the Tories (and herself) an early General Election victory over Labour by putting it front and centre.

Returning to some Labour MPs' responses to Corbyn's initiative; another 'New Party' flag is yet again being waved across all parts of the media. Tinged by the relentless media 'discoveries' of yet more anti-semitism in the Labour Party, a group of Labour MPs see Corbyn's latest Brexit deal as (another) final straw. The leading right wing British newspaper, the Daily Mail stated that 6 Labour MPs were considering breaking from Labour (this time.) They were joining up with pro EU Tory MPs in a 'centrist' arrangement. It is not clear if they are going to set up (a fourth) pro EU Party.

The trouble for Labour's future is the the splitters are not going to split. Not now. Not yet. Like lemmings they have scuttled to the precipice, expecting to lead a wave of followers, only to discover that it is the same old 6 (and the last time they turned back - it was at least 20!) It is frustrating. A solid core of Labour MPs have hated the Labour Party since Corbyn became its leader (twice.) They hated the (quite gentle) Labour Manifesto of 2017 and more; they were in despair about Labour's huge vote in the General Election, which they hoped would demonstrate the need to get Corbyn out.

The signal that these lost Labour souls used to follow was the Blairite assumption that the radical madness rediscovered among old lefties in the Labour Party, but now in the leadership, was a blip, a moment of madness and that the normal regime would soon be resumed. Now Labour MPs, like Chuka Umunna, do not any longer believe that the Labour Party is recoverable in its traditional sense. They have therefore moved on. They recognise that the Corbyn leadership has built a huge base in society and are therefore working on the creation of their own new base, directly related to the millions of supporters in favour of membership of the EU. That is why, unlike Corbyn and the other members of Labour's leadership, they do insist that Brexit is the predominant and ultimate question for Britain. They are not interested in any radical transformation of the UK's politics and economics. They never were. They were interested in national posts in traditional Labour governments and now in a new, potential base of ardent EU remainers ready for the next run at the precipice. They pose Brexit as the critical question - for that reason.

The contradictions for the Umunna's of this world is that a large majority of those who voted to remain in the EU were younger and in general they correctly do not see the EU question as the only issue. Even those who want to promote reform of the EU are diminished in their aspiration by the actual experience of the would-be reformers - already campaigning - but successively retreating, in EU member country after EU member country.  The various desperate but deliberate attempts to split younger voters off from the radical leadership of the Labour Party are not so inviting to them when the alternative to Corbyn's Labour Party is a re-run of Blairism and the de facto acceptance of austerity.

In that precise sense, the denial of the number one priority of breaking austerity, of reorganising the economy and of making inroads against widening inequality, the Labour MPs who are trying to use the idea that the EU is the essential, the only goal, are actually defending the traditional status quo against Labour's radical alternative. They have placed themselves as the servants of the City of London, big business and the destruction of any radical alternative to the reign of big Capital across a continent.

The divisions in the working class over Brexit, the Scottish vote to remain, the votes to remain in the big cities and among the larger ethnic groups as well as the under 40s, reflected in part a resistance to racism in 2016 and hostility to the rising right. Today the radical program and leadership of the LP has changed the central question for Scotland, for Wales, for England and for Ireland. The working class of Britain needs desperately to re-unite. Anti austerity alliances are the key. Corbyn's EU plan helps to open that door. Unity of the working class is desperately needed to build the radical resistance to the current and increasingly brutal British and EU capitalist system.

However an entirely different division needs to be accelerated to win that unity. Pushing through the currently divisions in the Labour Party are the key to winning Labour's leadership of radical reform. Unlike the Tory faction fights, Labour's split is profound and unavoidable in the development of future politics. And the sooner it is done the greater will be the clarification of what is essential in Britain, what must change and what must fall away.