Greece; back to the wall; back to basics

The Syriza leadership have characterised the action of the financial institutions used by the EU (the European Bank and the International Monetary Fund) and the direction they took from the European Council, as an attack on the dignity, the democratic will and the future prospects of the Greek people. They have come to this conclusion out of their prolonged struggle with these bodies; in other words directly from their own experience. The Greek proposition, that the permanent debt / austerity model of Western European capitalism is a failure, had been decisively rejected by Europe's main leaders. Syriza has now deployed the only counterforce which it is able to engineer - that is to say the democratic view of the Greek people themselves. Greece will decide who rules Greece, Europe's current leadership, or the Greek people. And this is a turning point for Europe, perhaps for the whole world. 

Opponents of the Greek government in Greece, like the remnants of Pasok, denounce Syriza for not taking the decision themselves whether to accept the Troika's 'offer'. But every democrat in the world is thrilled by Syriza's 'choice'; to denounce the deal but to ask the people for their agreement. This is a huge decision in people's lives. It is magnificent and historic to see democracy used to determine key issues of power and wealth that have for so long in the West been unavailable for public scrutiny let alone public choice. Opponents of the Greek government outside Greece are now scared. They were working for regime change in Greece but they were not prepared for a decisive rebuttal now from the whole of Syriza. Will Angela Merkel be the first European leader to reduce the 'ever closer union'? Will the first major act of the new European Central Bank be to allow the Greek Euro-based economy to slide into chaos? Will the non payment of the IMF loan lead to a repudiation of all Greek debt? 

The next period in Greece will obviously be determined by the course of and by the outcome of the referendum. (Although it is not altogether impossible that the Troika might be induced by Merkel and the US to make concessions - if only to muddy the vote.) It will also set the frame for the entire anti-austerity fight - certainly in the rest of Europe - and should the reputation of the IMF be restored - across large parts of the globe as well. In Europe the prospects for Podemos in Spain, Sinn Fein in Ireland, anti-austerity forces in Portugal will hinge in large part on the Greek outcome. Should Greece slide into social collapse and political chaos, which some in Merkel's party openly and cheerfully predict, then the Front National in France, the Danish and British far right will be significantly strengthened. Their cry will be that the left cannot deliver true independence from German hegemony, from mass immigration and from failed internationalism - because the left exists, pthe right claims, to invariably promote the subordination of national identity!  

But the defence of the Greek nation now and its political and economic integrity, is a most decisive national and international task. The Greek government has to rise to the leadership of the whole nation, one of the least economically developed in Europe, to insist on the right of Greeks to a modern, mutually supportive, socially advanced country. Greek wealth and power is held in large part by an oligarchy; more similar to Latin American models of ruling elites than traditional European dominant classes. The Greek oligarchs have adapted to globalisation and taken their companies' names to Hungary or to international waters etc., to avoid tax. Underneath them are more than 720,000 small businesses. There are 73 small businesses for every 1000 Greeks. In Greece 60 % of employees, including those in the public sector, work in businesses employing under 10 workers. (In the US it is 11%. In the UK it is 21%. In Germany it is 19%.) This structure of capitalist enterprise is highly vulnerable to low capitalisation, family employment, loan poverty and requires a high use of services by a economically secure population. Erratic and uneven income is the norm and this is also associated with difficulty in planning of government tax revenues. 

If a new Greek nation is to be created, whether remaining inside or outside the EU, albeit definitively outside the Euro, which is aimed at securing the most advanced conditions already available to the populations in the northern European countries, it follows that a most radical reorganisation of the Greek economy will be required. Following on from an inevitable deep currency devaluation for the new currency, accompanied by swingeing measures to hold the line against any further impoverishment for the mass of Greek's working class population, a decisive new economic policy will need to be created and should rest on three pillars. 

First, the oligarchy needs to be immediately expropriated. All its assets, its fixed capital in Greece and whatever can be rescued from foreign banks etc requires seizure. Like the 1974 abolition of the Greek monarchy, the oligarchy (but not the managers who will unfortunately have to be bribed) must be abolished and sent packing. This is essential because the government must control the main economic levers available, stabilise them before they are ransacked or stolen by their owners, and keep trade and production turning.  Second, presented as an emergency measure only, the government must take a monopoly over all movement of big capital and therefore incorporate the main banks, pension funds, large private fortunes and insurance and finance companies in a rigid legal framework, with inspection, to prevent the nation's wealth disappearing. Resourses from this source are needed to shore up state services and decisively win the small business owners. Third, key national assets, ports, pipelines, airlines etc must be immediately nationalised or renationalised with assurances to previous partners offered, and new partnership arrangements sought for their use, involving strict requirements for long term investment and the use of Greek labour with their established conditions guaranteed. 

These measures need direct attention, before counter measures on the streets and in the barracks can get beyond idle chat and into the planning stage. The economic programme of the government as a fait accomplis is the best argument to stall those who want to act illegally. They will still be there and they will have secret money and international friends. The best defence is speed and clear definition of the actions required and the mobilisation of the people who have a new country to build. 

These suggestions may seem dramatic but they are, simply and coldly, a measure of the depth of the crisis that Greece now faces. Previous defaults were mainly carried through by rightist governments (e.g. Argentina which, although successful after 5 or 6 years, went forward by making the poor bear the terrible costs.) The Greek government must make other richer classes take the weight of the changes it needs to make to rebuild its nation - where hope really has turned into practice.